18th Annual Midwest Conference on Chinese Thought

Indiana University

Bloomington, Indiana

April 12-13, 2024

All events held at the McCalla Building, Rooms 158 and 120

(525 N Indiana Ave, Bloomington, IN 47408)

Open to the public, no registration required

Schedule

Friday, April 12  

1:30-2 

  • Alexus McLeod. Generation (sheng 生) and Completion (cheng 成) in the Neiye. (FX 158)  
  • Judson Murray. Examining the Colors of Grief in the Zhuangzi. (FX 120) 
2-2:30 
  • Franklin Perkins, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. Skepticism, judgment, and emotion in the Zhuangzi. (FX 158)  
  • Chi FENG. Beyond a Linear Discourse: Interpreting Parallel Texts in “Yueji” 樂記  and “Yuelun” 樂論. (FX 120)  
2:30-3 
  • Zach Joachim. Mòzǐ’s Moral Cosmos. (FX 158) 
  • Stephen Walker. “Doing the right thing” (yi 義) in the Huainanzi. (FX 120) 

3-3:15              Break 

3:15-3:45 
  • Borong ZHANG. Common people’s Political status in Mozi and Xunzi in relation to their Epistemic Competence (FX 158) 
  • Geir Sigurðsson. The Kantian Conundrum in Modern Confucianism: A Motivational Approach. (FX 120) 
3:45-4:15 
  • Mercedes Valmisa. Music and the Power of Reorganization. (FX 158) 
  • Edgar Vasquez. Is Empathy a Strike against Ren? (FX 120) 
4:15-4:45 
  • Joseph Lam. A 21st century response to Confucius’s Music Question—“Music, Oh Music; Does It Mean Merely the Striking of Chime-bells and Drums?” (FX 158) 
  • Thomas Jackson. The Drama of Moral Perfection: Early Chinese Thought in Conversation with Goffman. (FX 120)  

4:45-5 Break 

5-6         Dinner (FX 158) 

6-7:30       Keynote Address (FX 158) 

  • Harvey Lederman. Wang Yangming on Principles and Things. 

 

Saturday, April 13

9-9:30 
  • Hagop Sarkissian, The City University of New York, Graduate Center & Baruch College. Zhu Xi on the Fourth Sprout. (FX 158) 
  • Brian Bruya, Eastern Michigan University. A Demorizic Theory of Governance: Self-Organization and Self-Regulation in Early China. (FX 120) 
9:30-10 
  • Jean Tsui. Let us be Taken by Affect, and to be Taken Away and Afar. (FX 158)  
  • Yiting TANG. Way and Skill in Zhuangzi and Heidegger: Toward the Skill Model of Lived Experience. (FX 120) 
10-10:30 
  • Shoufu YIN. The Dialectic of Virtue Politics: Wang Zhiwang’s (1103–1171) Argument for Popular Political Participation. (FX 158)  
  • Jennifer Wang. A Social Constructionist Account of Rén (仁) in the Analects. (FX 120) 

10:30-10:45     Break 

10:45-11:15 
  • Philomena WANG. Selling Catholicism in a Confucian Land: Matteo Ricci’s Creative Interpretation of Classics in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven. (FX 158) 
  • Samuel Cocks. Chan Buddhism, Nonsentient Beings, and “expounding the dharma.” (FX 120) 
11:15-11:45 
  • Woohui Park. Seeking Truth in Actual Events: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Mid-Qing Philosophy. (FX 158) 
  • Ernest Brewster. On the nature of cessation in the Cheng weishi lun. (FX 120) 
11:45-12:15 
  • Ori Tavor. The Varieties of Green Utopianism in Contemporary China. (FX 158)  
  • Hao HONG. The Power of Indecisiveness: An Interpretation of Wu-wei (無為) in Daodejing. (FX 120) 

12:15-1:45       Lunch Break 

1:45-2:15 
  • Ross Moncrieff. Confucianism and the Enlightenment: Comparisons and Connections between Early Modern Chinese and British Moral Philosophies of Emotion. (FX 158) 
  • Julianne Chung. Zhuangzi Applied: The Creative Power of Global Skepticism. (FX 120) 
2:15-2:45 
  • Yi SHAN. Leafing Through the Past: Book Collecting and Intellectual Subjectivities in China, from the Late Qianlong to the Early Republican Eras. (FX 158) 
  • Susan Blake, Occidental College. Epistemic virtue in the Zhuangzi. (FX 120) 
2:45-3:15 
  • Yuyuan ZHANG. Kingly Virtues and Autonomy in Relationality: A Comparison of the 17th-Century French and Chinese “Mirrors for Princes” (FX 158) 
  • Rose Novick, University of Washington. “Your years are many, yet your hue is as a babe’s—how?”: The Trans Zhuangzi. (FX 120) 

3:15-3:30       Break 

3:30-4 
  • Joo-Hyeon Oh. Clam Towers: On the nature of natural knowledge in late imperial China. (FX 158)  
  • Sophia Gao. A Feminist Confucian Path to Care: Expanding Care’s Reach Outward and Inward through Caring Thinking. (FX 120) 
4-4:30 
  • Simon Luo. Mao Zedong and the Art of Mourning. (FX 158) 
  • Iris Hu.War and Shame–A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults between the Confucians and their Interlocutors. (FX 120)  
4:30-5 
  • Brian Hoffert. King Zheng's Great Debate: A Role-Playing-Game on Warring States Philosophy. (FX 158)  
  • L. K. Gustin LAW. Mengzi’s Reception of Meng Jizi’s All-out Externality Statement on Yi 義. (FX 120) 

 

Abstracts (in order of presentation): 

Alexus McLeod. Generation (sheng 生) and Completion (cheng 成) in the Neiye.  

The concept of cheng 成 (“completion”) plays a greater role in the early Chinese text Neiye 內業 (4th c. BCE) than in most other self-cultivational texts built on what are later understood as “Daoist” conceptions of dao 道, and one tied to a human role in the creation of the cosmos. I look here at the connection between the completion of things (wu 物) and the completion of potency (de 德), arguing that we find an explicit connection between the spontaneous activity of things in the world in terms of their emergence from dao and the activity of the sage, whose completive action is similarly understood as creative. Through engaging in the meditative exercises and techniques of self-cultivation the Neiye discusses, one develops the ability to play an active role in constructing the cosmos itself. I argue here that the completive activity of the sage in the Neiye is ultimately the same as the creative activity of tian 天, but only insofar as the prospective sage can become more like tian in achieving non-agentive activity, which is connected with both generation (sheng 生) and completion (cheng). I also argue that sheng and cheng in the Neiye represent two stages of creation, rather than distinct metaphysical and ethical concepts, and that the Neiye’s conception of dao is connected to the manner in which things are generated and completing, thus providing a link between metaphysical (dao as object or state) and ethical (dao as achievement) conceptions of dao. 

 

Judson Murray. Examining the Colors of Grief in the Zhuangzi.  

In this presentation I bring the ancient Chinese thinker Zhuangzi into conversation with the contemporary philosopher Mariana Alessandri concerning grief. The conversation imagined between them is bidirectional. On the one hand, I discuss whether it is useful, exegetically, to analyze accounts of dying and death that appear in the Zhuangzi (e.g., of Zilai, of Laozi, of Zhuangzi’s wife, and of Zhuangzi himself) through what Alessandri, in her recent work Night Vision: Seeing Ourselves through Dark Moods, calls the West’s “Light Metaphor” or through her own construct of “night vision.” The Western philosophers that she associates with the former (e.g., Aristotle, Stoic philosophers, Marcus Aurelius) view deep or extended grief harshly, as a sign of, for instance, weakness, irrationality, self-pity, ingratitude, or “brokenness.” Conversely, Alessandri, inspired by the experiences and Existentialist sentiments expressed by, for example, Miguel de Unamuno and C. S. Lewis, argues that to grieve while employing “night vision” is to use it constructively to empathize, to connect, with others and ourselves, and to heal. Does her spectrum of Western responses to grief offer a helpful interpretive lens through which to understand Zhuangzi’s perspective(s)? On the other hand, I explore whether, as with the multiplicity of perspectives that Zhuangzi articulates in the text, there are additional “colors of grief,” representing a broader spectrum of human emotional responses to loss, beyond those of the binary of light and dark.  

 

Zach Joachim, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Denison University. Mòzǐ’s Moral Cosmos. 

The problem of evil focuses primarily on why God (an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being) permits suffering. But there are other bad things too, such as wrongdoing, disobedience, and hangnails. Why does God permit bad things at all? Call this the “problem of a moral cosmos." In this paper, I present Mòzǐ as the first to pose the problem of a moral cosmos in East Asian thought. For Mòzǐ, any good befalling an agent is Heaven rewarding them for benefitting the world, any bad befalling an agent is Heaven punishing them for harming the world, and Heaven is God. As such, anything bad ultimately benefits the world, and so is extrinsically good; thus, under Heaven, all is (extrinsically or intrinsically) good. Against Perkins (2014) and Fraser (2016), I argue that Mohism poses but cannot resolve the problem of a moral cosmos, and a fortiori cannot resolve the problem of evil. But this is good, I conclude. For by accepting that Mòzǐ’s moral cosmos is problematic, we more cleanly expose what subsequent Chinese thought—asserting Heaven’s moral ambiguity (Ruism) or vacuity (Daoism)—characteristically rejects. I thus submit Mòzǐ (following Ziporyn 2015) as Chinese literate culture’s early inoculation against the very idea of God. 

 

Franklin Perkins, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. Skepticism, judgment, and emotion in the Zhuangzi.  

The first part of this talk will compare parts of the Zhuangzi to Sextus Empiricus. While both use skeptical strategies to eliminate negative emotions such as grief and anger, their approaches diverge in ways that reveal fundamental differences in their understandings of emotion and judgment. For Sextus, the goal is to consistently withhold judgment about whether an event is good or bad by constructing equally powerful arguments for each side. In the Zhuangzi (or at least parts of it) withholding judgment plays little role and the focus instead is on the ability to switch from one perspective to another. Rather than always see events as neither good nor bad, one can view something as good or as bad, depending on the context. This gives the Zhuangzi an appealing position rejected by almost all other peace of mind traditions (e.g. Stoicism, Buddhism): one can have normal happy emotions while avoiding sad ones. But how is that possible? I will argue that the Zhuangzi understands the relationship between emotions and judgments in a very different way, one that is oriented around seeing or taking something in a certain way rather than focused on belief and judgments of truth. 

 

Borong ZHANG, Graduate student, Indiana University. Common people’s Political status in Mozi and Xunzi in relation to their Epistemic Competence 

Political epistemology, situated at the intersection of political philosophy and epistemology, explores how agent’s understanding of knowledge shapes one's political engagement. In this instance, it is easy to center the discussion on epistemic elites, such as how their knowledge claims can influence political decisions and the legitimacy of authority, contrasted with skepticism towards the political awareness and competence of the less educated, such as concerns over voter ignorance. 

This focus is also true in current scholarship on epistemology in early China, where knowledge was closely tied to one's ability to discern right (shi 是) from wrong (fei 非) in accordance with the Dao. Given that the common populace lacked formal training and indoctrination, such epistemic theories often marginalized those who were less educated. However, not all philosophical traditions adopt this stance. To moving beyond the predominant focus on social elites in early China and exploring the political status of common people, I will examine contrasting views on the political competence of commoners as portrayed in the texts of Mozi and Xunzi. While both interpretations acknowledge the common people's role in legitimizing political authority, they differ in their portrayals of common people's political status. Mozi depicts them as active political participants, whereas Xunzi views them more as passive subjects. I want to argue that this discrepancy stems from their differing perspectives on how competent uneducated people are in grasping the essence of Dao and whether Dao can be easily understood. The Mohists aim to elaborate on their models (法) in selecting human activities resembling the Dao, rendering them as normative and akin to operational processes accessible to common people, who can even utilized these models to evaluate the merits of their ruler; while Xunzi argues that Dao, as a creation of sage-kings, is too elaborated to grasp without formal Confucian training. Through the lens of political epistemology, we can seek alternative potential seeds of Chinese democracy beyond the traditional discussion mostly revolved around Confucianism, and contribute to the ongoing discussion about epistemic democracy.  

 

Stephen Walker. “Doing the right thing” (yi 義) in the Huainanzi. 

In this presentation I’ll be mining the Huainanzi for its model of appropriate behavior (yi), not just because this non-Confucian model is fascinating in itself but also because it speaks directly to live concerns about cultural diversity and moral relativism. The Huainanzi writers argue that every concrete and determinate conception of rightness is a contingent response to the problems faced by particular groups of people. Every model of yi that associates it with specific exemplars, traits, or actions can and should be read as the expression of a finite point of view, most likely competent in solving certain problems but increasingly irrelevant as points of view diversify and situations change. The writers advance this model not to discredit yi or reduce it to mere prejudice but to focus readers on the question of what all culturally prevalent systems of norms have in common. As they see it, yi in any of its functional forms overcomes mutual dislike and competition by requiring people to restrain themselves, to make themselves predictable, and to communicate with those around them in mutually pleasing ways. Hence, the writers argue, debates about what’s right are either (when done with care) debates about which course of action will be more pleasing and predictable for some specific group of people or (when not) unilluminating clashes between people accustomed to different pleasures and predictions.  

  

Chi FENG （Graduate student, Indiana University Bloomington）. Beyond a Linear Discourse: Interpreting Parallel Texts in “Yueji” 樂記  and “Yuelun” 樂論.  

“Yueji” 樂記 (“Record of Music”) in Liji 禮記 (Book of Ritual) and “Yuelun” 樂論 (“Discourse on Music”) in Xunzi 荀子 are two of the most important texts in early Chinese musical thoughts. Their sequential relationship in transmission has been a heated debate in preceding studies. I argue, however, that a more feasible and valuable analysis on their parallels is to read them as a product of compilation. I will begin by examining their discourse on human nature, human condition, and music, in order to observe the similarities and differences of the two chapters and their connection with other chapters in Xunzi and Liji. Then, I will discuss the reasons for these similarities and differences, especially how and why these shared materials are collected into Xunzi. Finally, subtle rhetorical differences in the shared materials can be explained by languages styles of other chapters of the two books. In conclusion, there is no need to assume a sequential relationship between the two chapters, because the compilers drew from a shared corpus, retained and added sections that correspond with the whole book, and excluded conflict or irrelevant ones during the compilation process. 

 

Geir Sigurðsson. The Kantian Conundrum in Modern Confucianism: A Motivational Approach.  

It is fair to say that Modern Confucianism was partly an offspring of The New Culture Movement and the May 4th Movement. The former was first and foremost aiming at modernization, while the precise and concrete meaning of modernization was disputed. Many if not most intellectuals chose a radical departure from China’s Imperial-Confucian past, essentially renouncing political Confucianism, its hierarchical, intergenerational, and patriarchal value system as well as its symbolic representational system of, say, family relations and relations between rulers and ruled. Most of these wanted to adopt a more Western-based system (among them being Hu Shi), but such a path was probably more and more ruled out with nationalist elements that emerged out of the May 4th movement. 

Others, however, claimed that modernization was only possible through a reformed kind of Confucianism. Confucianism, they argued, was indispensable if China was to keep its national characteristics, and yet it had to be adapted to the needs of the times. The most prominent of those who made such explicit claims were Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. 

While the legacy of Kang and Liang is clearly reflected in modern Confucianism’s insistence on continuing the Confucian “way,” many proponents of modern Confucianism had even higher philosophical aspirations in that they sought to demonstrate not only the profound philosophical value of Chinese thought but even its superiority to Western philosophy in terms of what it can achieve. In this paper, I want to discuss such claims found in the philosophies of two prominent Modern Confucians, namely Feng Youlan, belonging to the first generation, and Mou Zongsan, belonging to the second, from the point of view of the main motivations that prompted them to formulate their philosophical responses to Immanuel Kant’s epistemology. Being the philosophical giant that he was in a Western (and thus universal) context, both Feng and (in particular) Mou found it necessary to engage with Kant’s philosophy to enable Chinese philosophy to take its rightful place as a valid kind of academic philosophy. 

An analysis of motivations is not meant to undermine the value of the philosophy in question, but it illuminates the fact that no philosophy – also not Kant’s – is created in a void. 

  

Mercedes Valmisa. Music and the Power of Reorganization.  

The analytic concept of powers is a shortcut to identify entities’ dispositions and tendencies. Namely, a certain regularity in the entity’s behavior that can be anticipated with a high degree of success even though it’s contingent upon the entities’ features as well as upon the assemblage of relations wherein the entity is constituted. The notion of powers has a guiding function: understanding things’ powers plays a crucial role in learning to better collaborate with things (i.e. adapting), and hence in enhancing human efficacy when acting in a volitional mode.  

In this talk, I invite you to consider an ancient technology that mediates relations between things’ powers and human responses to them. That is, a technology that makes available not only things’ powers that are considered relevant to humans but also effective human collaboration with such particular powers. This technology is music. I understand technologies in the broad sense offered by philosopher Alva Nöe, in which technologies are organized ways of engaging with things which enable us to do things we couldn’t do without them (e.g. to fly or to work in an office space; but also, as we’ll see with music, to co-create the most appropriate emotion for a certain goal-in-a-situation). Technologies are crafts, skillful activities which organize us, not mere tools or neutral means we use to achieve certain goals. Since antiquity there’s also been an awareness that it’s not only the case that human-things interactions are organized by means of technology; it’s also the case that such interactions can be shaped and modified by means of technology. In other words, since antiquity, the organizational power of technology has often been harnessed to reorganize human emotions, behavior, choices, and agency overall. That is, humans have often allied with material and technological praxes to exercise influence, to educate and cultivate, to shape, change, and transform.  

I discuss the case of Confucian musical theory (i.e. Records of Music—Yueji 樂記, and the odes—shi 詩 qua multimedia art form), in which music is one of the oldest technologies to encode, store, and translate (i.e. mediate) ways of listening to the world: ways to perceive and make reality along with things, including the emotional responses (qing 情) that things afford and the dispositions and behaviors that obtain from our interactions with things. Namely, fitting ways of feeling and acting. I put Confucian musical theory in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of music (e.g. Leonard Meyer) and the neuroscience and social psychology of emotion (e.g. Lisa Barrett). Combining the three, I argue that music’s power to reorganize our emotional experience and behavior lies with its ability to expand our repertoire of qing.  

Qing aren’t universally given nor necessary: there’s more than one way to emotionally respond to situations. Such a proposition entails that it’s possible for us to train and cultivate our qing. The array of qing that we encounter in music helps us gain in what Barrett calls emotional granularity (a concept I’ll explain in light of Analects 17.9 “From [the odes] we learn the more immediate duty of serving one’s father and the remoter duty of serving one’s prince”). Emotional granularity also affords us the distance to critically reflect on our own emotional concepts, goals, and responses. It offers us the opportunity to realize that we aren’t merely reactive when it comes to our emotions, to broaden our emotional horizons, and to become more responsible for the emotions that we co-create along with things. In this way, the technology of music allows us to do emotions better, in a more fitting manner according to specific situations and goals. 

 

Edgar Vasquez. Is Empathy a Strike against Ren?

The utility of empathy as a moral emotion has been called into question in recent years. Although we might expect empathy to motivate prosocial action, there is good reason to believe that empathy biases and misdirects us. For example, we may prioritize people who are similar to us over those who are different, or we may defend one side against another simply because we were primed to. This poses a problem for Confucian ren 仁, which involves a significant level of empathy. In this talk, I analyze the Analects and the Mencius, exploring ren’s complex meaning and relationship to empathy. I also call attention to the fact that Confucius and Mencius were aware of concerns accompanying the use of empathy as a moral guide and did not promote it uncritically. Donald Munro proposed a two-tiered ethic which provides a framework that allows for the presence of empathy while avoiding the principal concern of bias. Instead of applying a single ethical system or mode of prioritization in all of our relationships, we can be rightly biased towards our own loved ones when it comes to our private lives. Contrastively, in the public sphere (voting, donation, activism, etc.) empathy is wholly put aside, thus avoiding the criticism that empathy misdirects our moral actions in public decision making. So, while ren involves empathy, Confucian philosophy is well equipped not only to survive criticism that empathy biases us, but also to acknowledge and take that criticism on board. Ren as a virtue is multifaceted, it calls not only for us to care about others, but to do so skillfully.  

  

Joseph Lam. A 21st century response to Confucius’s Music Question—“Music, Oh Music; Does It Mean Merely the Striking of Chime-bells and Drums?”  

When Confucius asked his disciples whether music (yue) means merely the performance acts and sonic results of striking chime-bells and drums ( the Analects, 17.9 ), he challenged his disciples to reflect on not only social-political meanings/functions of music, but also on its composition, performance, and reception. Traditional Chinese scholars have intellectually responded to the challenge, generating a wealth of theoretical studies on music as a counterpart/component of Chinese ritual and a means of self-cultivation and governance. As a result, Confucius’s question has been circumvented into a historical and China-specific concern, one that is hardly relevant to 21st century music scholarship. Confucius’s musicality is, however, intellectual and practical, a fact that music passages in the Analect and other contemporaneous documents attest. And any critical reading of such passages would find that Confucius’s musicology has many conceptual overlaps with its 21st century and international music practice and scholarship. For example, Confucius’s comment on sonic structure and affects indexes an analytical and hermeneutic approach to music (the Analects 3.23). His protest against Jihuanzi’s indulgence of female music projects a discourse on music performance by gendered bodies (the Analects, 18.4). And his disgust with a nobleman’s performance of music and dance in the imperial format (bayi) reveals his insights on dynamic interrelationships among music,  performance times and venues, and identities of performers and audiences. To demonstrate conceptual parallels between Confucius’s musicology and its 21st century counterpart, this paper will compare musicological concepts underlying the philosopher’s music comments with those found 21st century and international musicology. 

 

Thomas Jackson. The Drama of Moral Perfection: Early Chinese Thought in Conversation with Goffman.  

Ritual, face, performativity, and moral transformation are core elements in both Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis and early Chinese thought. However, as of now, little dialogue exists between these traditions; this project attempts to bridge that gap through  comparative analysis. 

Firstly, the project explores the divergences in understanding social performativity between these two traditions. It argues that while there are significant divergences in their respective positions, there are also important ways in which the traditions can learn from each other. 

Secondly, the project explores what fruitful insights might be gained from sustained engagement between these traditions. 

In the case of Goffman, I argue that Confucianism can help to understand and develop a concept of normativity in Goffman’s work, addressing critiques by commentators such as John Welsh, who argue that Goffman’s work lacks normative depth. 

In the case of early Chinese thought, I argue that Goffman’s work can assist modernization projects currently being undertaken. In modern multicultural societies, social relationships have changed significantly from the time of classical Confucians; I argue that Goffman’s work offers useful frameworks to modernize and implement concepts such as ritual, and to understand Confucian performativity in the modern world. 

Through this work the project aims to increase International communication, and interdisciplinary work in the academy as well as providing new intellectual resources for both Goffman studies and Confucianism. 

 

Harvey Lederman. Wang Yangming on Principles and Things. 

According to a textbook story, Song-Ming (960-1644) "Confucian" thought divides into two schools: a conservative, orthodox "school of Principle", and a more radical, heterodox "school of Mind". On this standard story, the great Ming Dynasty thinker Wang Yangming (1472-1529) was the most sophisticated proponent of the School of Mind; he counts as a member of the school because of his signature claim that "Mind just is Principle" (心即理). This talk takes up the venerable, difficult question of what, exactly, Wang meant by this claim. Some have suggested that, for Wang, it represents only a shift in emphasis from the doctrines of his predecessors. Others have argued that the claim embodies Wang's total rejection of their world-view, suggesting that here, as well as in in his oft-repeated claim that "what the mind is directed at, is a thing" (意之所在便是物), Wang in some relevant sense denied the mind-independence of ordinary objects and endorsed a form of idealism. I aim to chart a middle path. The first half of the talk considers the evidence related to "principle". I suggest that Wang did indeed make striking new claims about the metaphysics of principle and mind, and in particular about the role of the mind in meta-ethical explanation. The second half of the talk turns to Wang's provocative remarks about "things". I suggest that these comments provide evidence that Wang held that the primary objects of ethical assessment are mental, but that he did not take a stand on the mind-dependence of ordinary material objects. 

 

Hagop Sarkissian. Zhu Xi on the Fourth Sprout.  

That the human mind comes pre-organized with the ‘beginnings’ or ‘sprouts’ (duan 端) of four important virtues is one of the most influential ideas in the history of Confucian thought. Nearly all scholars treat the Four Sprouts as tokens of the same kind of mental phenomenon—namely, as emotions. Indeed, Zhu Xi calls them all qing 情 or ‘emotions’ in his commentary to the canonical Mengzi 2A6. And yet, if we look at them one by one, only some of them seem to be emotions in any straightforward sense. In particular, the fourth sprout—affirming/denying (shifei 是非)—seems unlike the rest. Most scholars attempt to assimilate it to the other three by characterizing it as a feeling (or sense) of ‘right and wrong’. Assuming the sprouts are emotions, this is an understandable translation choice. But is such an assumption warranted?  

In this presentation, I draw on some passages from a letter written by Zhu Xi late in his life to answer this question. The account there is striking. Not only does Zhu Xi characterize the fourth sprout in overtly cognitive terms, but he depicts it as meta-cognitive, taking the first three sprouts as the objects over which it operates. According to him, the fourth sprout chooses which movements of the first three sprouts should be accepted as right or rejected as wrong, thereby creating a storehouse (zang 藏) of knowledge. This results in wisdom (zhi 智), the completion of moral experience. I will end by suggesting that these passages present us a concise account of moral learning from Zhu Xi’s perspective. 

 

Brian Bruya. A Demorizic Theory of Governance: Self-Organization and Self-Regulation in Early China.  

Focusing on chapters 21 and 32 of the Dialogues of Confucius (Kongzi jia yu 孔子家語), I reconstruct a multi-level theory of governing that is a cyclic process proceeding from the moral psychology of the individual to social organization, to the society as grounded in natural processes, and to the metaphysics of the natural processes themselves, thus adumbrating a metaphysics of morals from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic.  This movement between macrocosmic and microcosmic levels encompasses moral psychology, economics, politics, aesthetics, and metaphysics.  The metaphysical forces that account for the blowing of the wind and the motivation of human behavior are forces that flow when functioning properly and that otherwise stagnate.  Maintaining that flow is the task of the leadership.  Once that task is accomplished, and the flywheel spins of its own momentum, the people become self-governing.  This multi-level cyclic process is compared to contemporary Western economic and political theory that is based on the unimpeded individual, aggregated into majoritarian democratic rule, based on the social contract, and vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons.  Contrary to current Confucian-based correctives to democracy that seek to limit the power of the people, this Confucian argument empowers the people via a frugal, caring, well-regulated leadership.  Demorizic: rooted (riza) in the people (demos)--minben 民本. 

 

Jean Tsui. Let us be Taken by Affect, and to be Taken Away and Afar.  

The paper explores how the incorporation of Wang Yangming’s (1472-1529) moral metaphysics in China’s modern political transition exposes the hidden anxiety of Confucianism as well as political modernity.  Being a faithful follower of Wang Yangming’s moral metaphysics, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) the modern political reformer once believed that man was instinctively capable of doing what is right and implementing by extension a legislative order that is good for the general public.  As Liang looked to the French Revolution to explore the feasibility of staging a political uprising in China, he disclosed how a political movement driven by people’s “instinctive impulses” was followed by the most tragic, fatal, and catastrophic consequences.  Considering the extreme brutality people displayed during the French Revolution, Liang brought home an uneasy discovery: what Confucian thinkers believed to be “instinctive moral goodness” can turn out to be a brutal, destructive force.  Besides shaking the moral-metaphysical foundation Liang identified for political modernity, this human destructive potential made Liang question man’s instinctive moral goodness, an article of faith that served as the foundation and inspiration for the Mencian school of Confucianism as well as Neo-Confucianism.  

Liang’s distrust for human and the unpredictability of human affect brought him to a prolonged period of self-denial and self-doubt.  For years he persisted to question: to what extent is man’s moral instinct reliable?  How thoroughly can people transmit their affective disposition to the kind of perfect political-moral ideal he aspired to?  And to what extent can one trust and rely on the people?  Focusing on the series of self-reflections Liang composed toward the last stage of his life, the paper examines how the reformer’s distrust for human affect contributed to his growing political pessimism between 1905 and 1915, how he tried to come to terms with such imperfection, finally accepted it, and ultimately attempted to transform human imperfection into a positive, constructive force in China’s unfinished journey to political democracy.   

 

Yiting TANG. Way and Skill in Zhuangzi and Heidegger: Toward the Skill Model of Lived Experience. 

In the Western philosophical tradition, practical activity is often theorized in rational-logical terms and understood against the background of a dualism between deliberation and execution. Three prominent accounts of action stand out: practical syllogism (Aristotle), logical derivation (Kant), and rational calculation (Mill). Call this the “rational-logical model”. In this paper, I explore an alternative—what I call the “skill model of lived experience”. This is the view that practical activity in everyday life is akin to skill performance, in the precise sense that it is a “purposeful” and “skill-like” “way-following”, i.e., a way and process of going along on a path in a purposeful manner and through skill-like or spontaneous engagement with things in the world. I investigate two intriguing versions of the skill model in the classical Daoist anthology Zhuāngzǐ and Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. My conclusion is that it is the skill model that captures our lived experience primarily and for the most part, and that the rational-logical model is secondary, derivative, and all by itself severely inadequate. 

 

Shoufu YIN. The Dialectic of Virtue Politics: Wang Zhiwang’s (1103–1171) Argument for Popular Political Participation.  

The idea of virtue politics, which advocates that the polity should be run by the virtuous ones, has garnered global acclaim. Overlooked in contemporary discussions are two epistemological challenges embodied by virtue politics: knowing who the virtuous ones are and knowing what policies actually benefit the people. While virtue politics believes that the best solution to “knowing what” is “knowing who,” in practice, the politics of the latter undermines the possibility of knowing anything. Thus argued Wang Zhiwang, for whom the epistemological challenge embedded in virtue politics necessitates the separation of “knowing what” from “knowing who.” For instance, instead of relying on the virtuous ones to decide on which taxation policy is most beneficial, it would be better for the government to collect opinions from all taxpaying units, regardless of their moral standing, and follow the majority’s choice. In 1156, Wang deployed this argument to justify the “referendum” he organized, in which all taxpaying units (namely, 333,700 households representing a population of 1.5 million) throughout the province voted on their preferred taxation policy. Examining both the historical significance and contemporary relevance of Wang’s argument, this essay proposes a sui generis “Wang Zhiwang moment” in the world history of democratization. 

 

Jenn Wang. Simon Fraser University. A Social Constructionist Account of Rén (仁) in the Analects.  

According to the Analects, it is only possible to become rén as part of a social community. McLeod takes this idea even further: rén is primarily a property of communities and only derivatively a property of individuals. Being a rén community is defined in terms of the performance of certain shared cooperative activities and dispositions. An individual is rén only in virtue of appropriately playing a social role in a rén community, and ceases to be rén outside of that particular community. I contend that it is a false dichotomy to say that either (i) rén is primarily a property of individuals because it is an internal quality or disposition or (ii) rén is primarily a property of communities. An individual’s being rén can be constitutively dependent upon community without it being primarily a property of community, on analogy with other socially constructed properties like being a woman or being Asian. This does not make being rén any less real or important. Because of the way that being rén depends upon community, it also marks an interesting feature of the early Confucian conception of moral virtue: not only does one need community to be rén, being rén is irreducibly tied to one’s social role. 

 

Philomena WANG. Selling Catholicism in a Confucian Land: Matteo Ricci’s Creative Interpretation of Classics in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven.  

This paper provides an analysis of Matteo Ricci’s Chinese work The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, especially his strategy in accommodate the tension between Confucianism and Catholicism. Matteo Ricci wrote this book in the aim of introducing Catholicism to Confucian scholars, which was a part of his missionary work in the late Ming China. It can be challenge for an Italian missionary to write about Catholicism in Chinese, while the research shows that Ricci did a good work in both fully using the Confucian intellectual sources and doing creative interpretation of Catholic ideas in Chinese context. As a result, he both contributed to the Confucian scholars’ debates on Confucianism and potentially supported the anti-Protestantism movement in Rome. However, his new interpretation may also undermine the authority of Roman Catholic Church, regardless that Ricci was trying hard to avoid this risk in his writing. Most parts of this paper will be text analysis. It focuses on Ricci’s discussion on human nature, a topic that Confucianism and Catholicism have lots of divergence with. 

 

Samuel Cocks (University of Wisconsin – La Crosse). Chan Buddhism, Nonsentient Beings, and “expounding the dharma.”  

A complex aspect of Chinese Buddhism lies in the common belief that all things express buddha-nature and that “nonsentient beings” expound the dharma. The current analysis is focused on Chan Buddhist interpretations of the former, especially the thinking of Chan Dongshan (807-869).  The notion of buddha-nature has been addressed in multiple ways.  For example, this concept can imply that (1.) all things are already enlightened or somehow participate in an enlightened world, including nonsentient beings, and (2.) that all things can assist with bringing about enlightenment. My claim is that a close reading of The Record of Dongshan supports the idea that the aspects of enlightenment expressed by nonsentient beings discussed in (1.) and (2.) should be understood as instances of the “filial.”  Nonsentient beings play many vital roles in a community of entities. On one hand, nonsentient beings (rocks, chairs, tiles, perhaps plants) can “expound the dharma” by providing direct evidence of entities that exist without the type of cognitive distortions associated with human actions marked by suffering, a sense of isolation, etc.  In so doing, each nonsentient thing effortlessly resonates, integrates, etc., with other objects, including human beings, in what could be called its relational field. On the other hand, whatever changes the nonsentient elicits in human life will never bring us to a metaphoric insentience, a common misunderstanding of the literature. Rather, I will argue that the nonsentient expounds the dharma in a way that is able to motivate what is distinctively human. 

 

Woohui Park. (Graduate Student, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) Seeking Truth in Actual Events: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Mid-Qing Philosophy.  

The primary objective of this paper is to philosophically reconstruct the Confucian catchword of Shishi Qiushi (實事求是)—seeking truth in actual events—, which was prevalent in the intellectual landscape in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century East Asia. The intellectual landscape of eighteenth-century Confucianism was ignited by the scholar questioning the epistemic justification in the learning process, shifting the focus from the justification of internal morality to external actualities. Often associated with scientific attitudes, “seeking truth in actual events” has been acknowledged by some scholars as shishiqiushi epistemology. However, its systematic and theoretical reconstruction in epistemological arguments remains unexplored. The scholars in the eighteenth century had a nuanced interpretation of shishiqiushi, but they shared the basic epistemic premises of knowledge. It posits that “If belief aims at seeking truth, one ought to form beliefs on the basis of actual events,” incorporating a deontological attribute. The major premise examined revolves around the aim of belief, namely, seeking truth, building upon two key premises: First, if one forms belief on the basis of actual events, the aim of belief—seeking truth—is achieved; second, the aim of belief ought to be achieved. This draws the conclusion that “one ought to form beliefs on the basis of actual events.” I will examine epistemic concepts, such as the aim of belief, truth, and justification, and actual facts or events. A comparative analysis of the epistemological approach is expected to guide us to a new philosophical perspective on the common ground mid-Qing scholar.

  

 

Ernest Brewster. Visiting Assistant Professor, Rutgers University. On the nature of cessation in the Cheng weishi lun.  

This paper examines the accounts regarding the nature of “cessation” (Sanskrit, hereafter, Skt.: vyaya, vināśa, anityatā; Chinese, hereafter, Chi.: mie滅) as a paradigmatic type of “absence” (Skt.: abhāva; Chi.: wu無) that are located within the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), the cornerstone doctrinal digest of East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism. In the Cheng weishi lun, the Sinitic scholar-monk Xuanzang玄奘 (602?-664 C.E.) and a coterie of editors employ the exemplar of cessation to investigate the characteristics of an absence in relation to “dharmas” (Chi.: fa法), the fundamental constituents that make up the entirety of reality. To Xuanzang and the other compilers of the Cheng weishi lun, cessation refers to the termination of the causally productive activity of a dharma, the extinction of which results in an absence. In their explorations into the nature of cessation, the Sinitic Yogācāra scholars combat the realist doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition, wherein cessation consists in a dharma that possesses “causal efficacy” (Skt.: kāritra; Chi.: zuoyong作用), the intrinsic power to produce causal results in the world. Xuanzang and his colleagues defend the anti-realist doctrine of the Yogācāra tradition, wherein an absence, such as cessation, is devoid of causal efficacy and therefore neither a dharma nor an amalgam of dharmas. To the Yogācāra anti-realists, an absence, and cessation as an example of an absence, is a “conceptual fiction” (Skt. prajñapti: Chi.: jiaming假名) lacking intrinsic reality. 

  

Ori Tavor (Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, University of Pennsylvania). The Varieties of Green Utopianism in Contemporary China.  

Over the past decade, the PRC government has advanced a range of environmental policies under the banner of “Ecological Civilization.” Hailed by Xi Jinping as “a green and low-carbon lifestyle of moderation and frugality,” this Chinese-branded environmentalism explicitly aims to offer an alternative to Western green philosophies by combining modern scientific theories with “Traditional Chinese Ecological Wisdom.” Alongside the top-down project controlled by the state, a variety of grassroots initiatives have embraced sustainability and a return to a more “traditional” lifestyle. Environmental activists, entrepreneurs, academics, and social media influencers have all promoted distinctive visions of green utopian living. This talk will present two responses to the emergence of Ecological Civilization discourse. The first, promoted by the Confucian scholar and activist Zhang Xiaolong, is a call for the creation of special Confucian Culture Conservation Zones, small autonomous rural communities dedicated to the preservation of a traditional way of life. The second comes in the form of the Qiandao Natural Farming Eco-Village in Zhejiang Province. Founded in 2014 by Guo Yongjin, a Taiwanese ordained Buddhist monk, doctor of Chinese Traditional Medicine, and scholar of Daoist philosophy, this community aims to recreate the ideal society described in chapter 80 of Laozi’s Daodejing. Drawing on the writings of Zhang Xiaolong and Guo Yongjin, I will outline the guiding principles of these two models of self-sustainable utopian living within the context of the state’s Ecological Civilization paradigm. I will argue that, while both projects are motivated by environmental concerns, their visions of an ideal society and philosophical goals are fundamentally different. Together, they reveal the diversity of contemporary thought regarding how aspects of Chinese tradition may be refashioned into contemporary utopian models.    

 

Hao HONG. The Power of Indecisiveness: An Interpretation of Wu-wei (無為) in Daodejing.  

When we do not perform an action, sometimes it is because we decide not to do it, and sometimes it is because we are so indecisive that we do not make any decision in time. In this paper, I propose an interpretation of Wu-wei 無為 in Daodejing 道德經 based on the latter case of not doing because of indecision or indecisiveness, whose moral value has been neglected and even criticized by many philosophers. I argue that Wu-wei recognizes and emphasizes the value and power of being indecisive. I will develop my interpretation in the following steps. First, I show that since indeterminacy is a central essence of Dao, indeterminacy in human practice—being indecisive—becomes a natural guide suggested by Dao for our practical life. Moreover, indecisiveness can be regarded as a constitutive element of the feminine trait of softness (rou 柔) in Daodejing, as opposed to its masculine counterpart, gang 剛, which carries the connotation of being decisive and is promoted by some philosophical schools, such as Confucianism and Legalism. Thinking of Wu-wei in terms of indecisiveness therefore aligns nicely with the overall emphasis on the feminine traits in Daodejing.  

 

Ross Moncrieff, All Souls College, University of Oxford. Confucianism and the Enlightenment: Comparisons and Connections between Early Modern Chinese and British Moral Philosophies of Emotion.  

There has been a growing body of scholarship comparing Confucian moral philosophies of emotion with those developed in eighteenth-century Enlightenment Britain. This paper examines whether eighteenth-century Britons noticed the connection between the moral theories of emotions being developed by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume and Adam Smith, and the Confucian ideas newly transmitted to them from China. The paper starts by pointing to similarities between Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucian and Jesuit neo-scholastic theories of emotion, both of which emphasised a conflict between the capabilities of the intellect and the need to control the disruptive forces of human emotions and desires. This was in contrast to unorthodox conceptions of emotion in both traditions, most obviously represented by Wang Yangming’s followers and Renaissance Epicureanism, both of which emphasised the importance of natural feelings. The paper then proceeds to trace the reception of Confucian philosophy in Enlightenment Britain through examining a range of British intellectuals. Although most accepted the Jesuit presentation of Cheng-Zhu theories of emotion, the author and intellectual Oliver Goldsmith fused Wangist neo-Confucian theories of emotion with new strains of Scottish Enlightenment thought derived from Hume. This raises questions about the Enlightenment’s debts and similarities to other, global philosophical traditions. 

  

Julianne Chung. Zhuangzi Applied: The Creative Power of Global Skepticism.  

Global skepticism is often considered idle, useless, or worse: a direct and substantive impediment to human flourishing. This attitude, however, is not universal. In a variety of philosophical traditions, such skepticism relates to a capacity to promote what are commonly construed as benefits, rather than drawbacks, and is held to be a powerful navigational tool. Focusing on a discussion of aspects of the Zhuangzi, a classic of Chinese philosophy, part one of this presentation explains how a globally skeptical orientation invited by features of this text can be interpreted as engendering a form of creativity that involves spontaneity and adaptivity rather than novelty or originality: that is, at first pass, as centrally involving contextually unanticipated or unplanned developments, whether substantively new or original, or not. Part two then elaborates ways in which the creativity-engendering, globally skeptical, aspects of this text surveyed can be applied in human life. It explores the possibility that rather than being unnecessary for, or an impediment to, the creative activities outlined, the globally skeptical orientation under consideration is necessary for them to proceed optimally, such that one is neither overly stifled nor too easily carried away while engaging in them. 

 

Yi SHAN. Leafing Through the Past: Book Collecting and Intellectual Subjectivities in China, from the Late Qianlong to the Early Republican Eras.  

In this paper, I examine the meanings of book-collecting through the eighteenth to the early twenti-eth centuries among Chinese intellectuals. I argue that two concepts—quan 全 (complete-ness/comprehensiveness) and yuanliu 源流 (lit. genealogy, origin and development)—significantly shaped how the Chinese scholars and cultural elites built, understood, and made use of book collections in this intellectually dynamic and volatile period. In this paper, I start with the example of Huang Pilie 黃丕烈 (1763–1825) and Gu Guangqi 顧廣圻 (1766–1835). Extensively discussed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among book-collecting scholars, Huang and Gu provided two vivid but different example for later scholars and collectors to emulate and to understand how they could integrate book collecting into everyday self-cultivation. Then, I shift to a group of scholar-collectors who lived through the turmoils of the late Qing (1840–1911), including Miao Quanxun 繆荃孫 (1844–1919) and Ye Changchi 葉昌熾 (1849–1917). Deeply anxious about the fate of the Qing empire and the intellectual and political tradition that the Qing embodied, these historical actors actively participated in the re-invention of state-sponsored institutional collections of books in China with very limited support from the Qing governments. 

 

Susan Blake. Epistemic virtue in the Zhuangzi.   

This paper explores interesting epistemic features of the Zhuangzi, particularly its ability to reject disagreeable and reprehensible epistemic vices like arrogance and closed-mindedness, while maintaining the courage of our convictions. An important part of this account is the distinctive flavor of skepticism in the Zhuangzi 2. By refusing to answer questions about whether we know what we know, the text implies that it makes no difference to our having knowledge whether we can correctly identify it as such. I argue that this implies that while we may know, we should not give too much credence to our own beliefs, since we cannot tell whether we are correct. This version of skepticism lends itself well to the avoidance of arrogance. It is also noteworthy for not implying further claims about how we should act or what we should believe, unlike, say, the skepticism of Hume which would be paralyzing if adhered to. This suggests that we should not always seek to abandon our habits of action and belief, though we should avoid extremes of certainty and arrogance. This suggests, then, that while rejecting the arrogance of certainty, we can continue to hold certain moral beliefs and beliefs about the world, and to act on our convictions. 

 

Yuyuan ZHANG (PhD student, Indiana University). Kingly Virtues and Autonomy in Relationality: A Comparison of the 17th-Century French and Chinese “Mirrors for Princes”  

The paper situates the discussion in 17th-Century France and China and focuses on the imperial rulers – Louis XIV (1638-1715), King of France, and Kangxi (1654-1722), Emperor of Qing Dynasty. It examines two “mirrors for princes” instructed by them respectively – Mémoires for the Instruction of the Dauphin (Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l’instruction du Dauphin) and Emperor Shengzu Ren’s Maxims of Court Instruction (Shengzu Ren Huangdi Tingxun Geyan 聖祖仁皇帝庭訓格言). The paper proposes a framework of relationality that includes three relationships of kings – the king-prince, the king-Heaven/Tian, and the king-subject. It argues that kingly virtues exist in both relationality and autonomy. Each relationship entails different virtues of the French and Chinese kings, who take a different role in each setting. In this relational framework, to become a good king, a prince must cultivate virtues that help him achieve fine balances of various yet connected relationships. Moreover, a virtuous king is not a passive object but an active agency in every relationship. He is motivated to act and rule, and his actions always entail and anticipate responses from others, including the prince’s filial duty, the Heaven/Tian’s blessing, and his people’s respect and love. This paper argues that, in the minds of Louis XIV and Kangxi, they did not consider themselves absolute as historians later portrayed, nor entirely dependent on their roles to live and act as some virtue theories suggest. 

  

Rose Novick. “Your years are many, yet your hue is as a babe’s—how?”: The Trans Zhuangzi.  

The Zhuangzi, though it hardly speaks of gender, is deeply trans-inclusive. I defend this claim on three grounds. First, it accounts for what gender transition is. Transition may look like a series of directional, effortful actions, but it is better understood on a model of non-action: of ceasing such attempts to force oneself into a particular gender. Second, it is non-accidentally inclusive. Trans-inclusion falls out of the text’s core commitments; it is not easily removable. The Zhuangzi’s analysis and critique of shifei judgments shows how they necessarily create a marginalized remainder. I argue that recognizing this offers a more compelling path to trans-inclusion than Confucian feminist attempts to bring trans people into the center. Third, it is not exclusively trans: it does not valorize transness at the expense of cisness. Since the Zhuangzi does not consider transness directly, I argue for this by considering its treatment of figures with non-normative physical bodies: the disabled, the criminal, the ugly. What the text recommends is neither to fit nor to fail to fit social norms, but to be unconcerned with one’s relation to them. So too for gender: transition is, in the end, incidental to having a “trans” relationship to gender. 

  

Joo-Hyeon Oh. Clam Towers: On the nature of natural knowledge in late imperial China.  

This paper examines sixteenth to eighteenth century Chinese writings found in encyclopedias, miscellaneous writings (筆記), and natural historical texts about a creature called shen 蜃and a related phenomenon called “sea markets and clam towers (海市蜃樓),”or mirages, which late imperial Chinese commonly understood to be caused by qi emanating from shen. This long-accepted fact began to be disputed in the late imperial period, as this paper will discuss. In examining the various descriptions, explanations, questions, and contemplations surrounding the cause and the nature of the “clam towers and sea markets,” I am not necessarily interested in demonstrating the failure or success of early modern Chinese in finding the “correct” scientific knowledge of how and why the mirages occur. Rather, I use the case of the mirage to critically reflect on the fundamental question of the nature of knowledge about the natural world in late imperial China. By the seventeenth century, some educated elites influenced by the Jesuit science proposed a qi-based naturalistic explanation that the mirage was caused by the reflection of light off water-qi vapor. This mode of explaining may seem “rational” and “scientific” to modern eyes in its denial of any allegedly supernatural or mythical connection between the mirage and shen, but it apparently fell short of satisfying the curious minds of other late imperial writers, who continued to wonder about the mirage, producing drawings and writings about shen as a kind of shellfish or a kind of dragon responsible for creating the mysterious phantasmagoric images of cities rising above the ocean waves. In fact, when we try to understand how late imperial Chinese elites engaged in the “investigation of things” (格物) to understand how the universe and things—especially those that has been the source of lasting enigma—habituating in it work, the grids of established categories of knowledge, especially so-called “factual” knowledge, seem more restrictive and confusing than clarifying and helpful. A thorough examination of late imperial writings on the mirages will reveal that literary, mythical, historical, textual, natural and empirical knowledge were interlocked together as layers to form an epistemic complex that had deep and enduring cultural significance as a repository of accepted “facts” about what exist in the world and how they work. Significantly, this way of knowing informed how late imperial elites observed, experienced, and understood the world around them. 

 

Sophia Feiyan Gao, PhD Candidate in Philosophy, University of New South Wales. A Feminist Confucian Path to Care: Extending Care’s Reach Outward and Inward through Caring Thinking 

This paper is part of a larger project that seeks to bring Mencian philosophical resources into dialogue with contemporary feminist care ethics, which provides a process-based understanding of caring relationships – how caring relationships take form, extend, and undergo power changes over time. Here, I explore how Mencian perspectives might provide insights for feminist care ethics in broadening the scope of care – extending care’s reach from close and particular individuals outward to distant and collective others and inward to the carer herself. In particular, I propose employing caring thinking to achieve this extension. By drawing insights particularly from the three usages of si (思) identified in the Mencius, I propose reconstructing si as a mode of caring thinking, which includes three aspects: relational sympathetic imagination, action-oriented thinking, and reflection. Importantly, each of these three aspects of this form of caring thinking may operate bidirectionally – towards others and towards oneself. When it is directed towards a suffering other, this si-inspired caring thinking may help demonstrate the performative aspect of a thinking process that facilitates the creation of caring relationships that previously may not have existed. When it is directed towards the carer herself, it may encourage and facilitate the carer to engage in self-care, which is vital for ensuring the completeness and sustainability of caring relationships. 

 

Simon Luo. Mao Zedong and the Art of Mourning.  

Contemporary political theory has witnessed a revived interest in theorizing the political implications of mourning. Largely drawing on contemporary disobedient actions in established liberal democracies, contemporary theorists of mourning tend to focus on how, by generating anger, mourning develops a function of political initiation and mobilization. In this paper, I challenge this rather narrow focus by analyzing Mao’s famous 1944 funeral oration, “Serve the People,” a text written in revolutionary conditions vastly different from the context of civil disobedience. Through an interpretation of Mao’s view on mourning and death, I argue that Mao addressed two key issues confronting members of any revolutionary community: (1) how to anticipate the inevitable losses in revolutionary actions, and (2) how to address the multifaceted nature of revolutionary work by routinizing mourning as an ordinary process organically incorporated to revolutionary life (as opposed to a spectacular site). Finally, I address how these two aspects of mourning have long disappeared from the CPC’s practice of mourning, which morphed into either a heroic chant of past endeavors or merely a process to reaffirm the deceased’s status in the party. By reclaiming the Maoist approach to mourning, I aim to broaden political theory’s understanding of mourning’s political meaning and flesh out the complicated relationship between ways to mourn and historical conditions.  

 

Iris Hu. War and Shame–A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults between the Confucians and their Interlocutors.  

What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This paper restores a historical debate in the Warring State period regarding how much control one have over one’s emotional responses to external stimuli. The discussion on can moral cultivation of one’s sense of shame guide and shield one from the experience of shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focused on the Confucians’ treatment of moral cultivation, inner virtues, and their relationship with rituals, and not their rival thinkers such as the Daoist, legalist, or much-neglected Songzi (~3rd Century BCE). Specifically, past discussion of shame-related phenomena and terms in Chinese philosophy such as chi, ru, xiu, and wu tend to focus on the Confucian texts and their discussion and presents an abbreviated picture of the full debate on the phenomenon of shame and its normative significance in different early Chinese ethical and political frameworks that were interlocutors of the Confucians and provoked much of the Confucian responses. Much like when they were discussing topics such as funeral rites and human nature, the Confucians are in dialogue with their rival philosophers from different schools of thought when discussing shame, insults, and their responses. For example, Xunzi addresses an internal tension within the Confucian classical texts regarding shame by responding to prominent philosopher Song Jian/Song Xing 宋鈃’s claim that there is “no shame in suffering insult” (JWBR見侮不辱) . Xunzi’s response to Songzi’s challenge to the Confucian view of a sense of shame as an inner virtuous quality is thus a successful attempt to address whether one’s inner quality can help one navigate compromising external circumstances. If Mencius’s focus on the four sprouts is viewed as an internal turn from Confucius’s focus on ethicized and institutionalized rituals (Jiang 2022, Graham 1989), Xunzi’s move can be seen as one that saves both the Confucian inner sense of shame and reconcile that with a more empirically accurate account of shame that reliably responds to external circumstances such as the consequences of violating rituals and other punishments. I argue that Xunzi’s strategic move is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and an important philosophical concession by admitting external stimuli’s function in inducing negative emotions.   

 

Brian Hoffert (Associate Professor of History and Religious Studies, North Central College). King Zheng's Great Debate: A Role-Playing-Game on Warring States Philosophy.  

Role-playing games (RPGs), such as the Reacting to the Past series that was pioneered by Mark C. Carnes (Professor of History at Barnard College) in the 1990s, adopt an active learning pedagogy in which students explore a topic by taking on roles that require them to communicate, collaborate, and compete in order to achieve assigned objectives. This approach flips the traditional classroom by placing students at the center of their own learning while transforming the role of the teacher from “the sage on the stage” to “the guide on the side.” This session will provide a brief overview of the RPG pedagogy followed by an exploration of a game on Warring States Philosophy that takes place in the court of King Zheng—the ruler who would go on to become the First Emperor of China. The game has not yet been published but is fully playable in its current form. 

 

L. K. Gustin LAW (Society of Fellows, University of Chicago). Mengzi’s Reception of Meng Jizi’s All-out Externality Statement on Yi 義. 

In Mengzi 6A5, a Meng Jizi argued that yì 義 (“propriety”) is “on the external, not from the internal.” Meng Jizi appealed to a special occasion where one is required by yì to act one way – pour wine for one’s fellow villager first – even though, putatively, one would feel a different way – namely, have a feeling of greater jìng 敬 (“reverence”) toward one’s eldest brother than toward the villager. Curiously, Mengzi responded with an even more special occasion, where one’s younger brother is personating a deceased ancestor at a ritual. Mengzi expected Meng Jizi to concede that one would and should “jìng the younger brother” over one’s uncle. Mengzi has been interpreted as expecting an empirical-psychological concession: that the agent occupying a special position would in fact feel jìng the same way as they ought to act. I discuss three reasons why this reading might not be correct. On the new reading: Mengzi used “jìng x” to signify behavior that privileges x over some third party, performed with a particular attitude – perhaps giving attention to x and treating x seriously – but in abstraction from whether the agent feels greater jìng toward x. Mengzi’s point was not empirical-psychological, but rather that instances of yì where the feeling and the act align are conceptually prior to those without such alignment. If this reading is right, the passage would favor one of many interpretations of what Mengzi perceived and resisted in Meng Jizi’s externality statement.