19th Annual Midwest Conference on Chinese Thought
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
La Crosse, Wisconsin
April 4-5, 2025
All events held in the Allen Conference Room in the Cleary Center
Open to the public, no registration required
Friday, April 4th
12:00-12:30 Chris Rahlwes (Lecturer, Smith College): “Zhuangzi’s Account of Drawing Distinctions”
12:30-1:00 Stephen Walker (Instructor, University of Chicago): “The well of Zhuangist governance: Four easy backward steps to falling in”
1:00-1:30 Yi Gong (Ph.D. Candidate, School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales): “The Concept of De (德) in the Political Thought in the Zhuangzi”
1:30-1:45 (break)
1:45-2:15 Shen Wenxuan (PhD student, Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville): “Philosophy as Justification: A Critical Examination of Cross-Cultural Psychological Studies”
2:15-2:45 Tom Jackson (PhD student, Indiana University): “From Southwest China to the World and Back: A Phenomenological Exploration of Ethnic Minority Teachers and the Dao of Transformation”
2:45-3:15 Alia Goehr (Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota) “The Moral Mind’s Outrage in Zhang Nai’s Must-Read Classical Literature (Bidu guwen 必讀古文)”
3:15-3:30 (break)
3:30-5:00 Keynote: Richard Kim (Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago): “Mencius on the Continuity Problem in Moral Development”
Saturday, April 5th
9:30-10:00 Amy Gardner (Graduate Student, Eastern Michigan University): “Fondness and Action: Hao 好 as Moral Motivation in Confucius’ Philosophy”
10:00-10:30 Brent Matheny (Ph.D. student in Philosophy, Penn State University): “Towards a Queer Confucianism: Identity Pride as a Virtue”
10:30-10:45 Break
10:45-11:15 Edgar Vasquez (Graduate Student, Eastern Michigan University): “The Confucian Dilemma of Service, in an Unjust World”
11:15-11:45 Aleksei Alward (Undergraduate Student Philosophy, Eastern Michigan University) - “Ritual Propriety and “Proper” Emotions: How Li and Feelings Interact in The Dialogues of Confucius”
11:45-1:00 Lunch
1:00-1:30 L. K. Gustin Law (Collegiate Assistant Professor, University of Chicago): “Mengzi and Aristotle on the ‘naturalness’ of virtue acquisition”
1:30-2:00 Hagop Sarkissian (Professor, CUNY Baruch): “Why did Mengzi claim that human nature is good?”
2:00-2:30 B Ben Huff (Professor, Randolph Macon College): “Freedom as a Moral Achievement in Mencius”
2:30-2:45 Break
2:45-3:15 Wenyang Gao (PhD Candidate, Brown University): “Intergenerational Responsibility: A Mencian Virtue-based Account”
3:15-3:45 Shizhen Xie ( School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales) “Is It Appropriate for Filial Children to Resent Their Parents? Rethinking Shun’s Resentment in the Mengzi
Paper Abstracts (in order of presentation)
Chris Rahlwes (Lecturer, Smith College): “Zhuangzi’s Account of Drawing Distinctions”
In the Qiwulun 齊物論 (Zhuangzi 莊子 2/4/16–2/4/20), Zhuangzi (or its author) propounds a philosophy of language centered on drawing distinctions between three distinct pairs or dyads: shi 是/bi 彼, shi 是/fei 非, and ci 此/bi 彼. In so doing, he criticizes indexical accounts of language, in which words refer in the way that a finger points, and expounds a differential account of language, in which the meaning of a word depends on the differences between its extension and another word’s extension. Zhuangzi’s critique of the indexical account of language appears directed at the Later Mohists’ and Gongsun Long’s characterization of names as designated by the indexical pair ci/bi (‘this’/‘that’). Contrasting this, Zhuangzi’s differential account focuses on the pairs shi/fei (‘this’/‘non-this’) and shi/bi (‘this’/‘that’) that create intertwined dyads. On this account, each side of the dyad depends on the other to be meaningful. More specifically, Zhuangzi holds that both sides of the dyads must successfully denote. Against the indexical account, Zhuangzi argues that the ci/bi of the Later Mohists depends on a vicious circularity of shi/fei, in which (i) a ci/bi distinction requires a shi/fei distinction, (ii) shi requires its complementary pair, bi, to be meaningful, and (iii) to establish this bi requiresthere to be an already established shi/fei–returning usto ii. Thus, ci/bi requires predetermined shi/fei which requires a predetermined bi. Such a vicious circularity condemns the indexical account but also shows that the differential account of language is likewise ungrounded. That is, neither a shi nor fei nor bi can be established before the other. In order to reconcile this issue, Zhuangzi ultimately appeals to yiming 以明 to ground his differential account of language. In connecting yiming to “Course as axis” (dao shu 道樞), Zhuangzi argues that one can spontaneously create new distinction drawings and their corresponding actions, allowing for shi and fei or shi and bi to jointly arise in way that places no causal preference for onside or the other. How this is done mirrors the actions of Butcher Ding in the Yangshengzhu 養 生主 (Zhuangzi 3/8/4–3/8/10) as he relies on distinction drawing in his interaction with the clustered tangle of sinew and meat. In all, Zhuangzi provides a way for the differential account of language to avoid the pitfalls he sets up for the indexical account of language.
Stephen Walker (Instructor, University of Chicago): “The well of Zhuangist governance: Four easy backward steps to falling in”
The Anglophone philosophical reception of the Zhuangzi has generally marginalized—if not outright ignored—this text’s investment in teaching readers how to govern well. The systematic advice about governance that is concentrated in chapters 11 to 16 typically gets sidelined as not part of “the core” of the Zhuangzi anthology; the arguments for this position have never been persuasive in historical or philological terms, and I would argue that one of the principal reasons that so many philosophical readers find it natural to ignore all this material is the entrenched interpretive presupposition that the Zhuangzi cannot be centrally concerned with governance. The fact is, one doesn’t even need to go outside the “core” inner chapters to see systematic advice for would-be leaders; meanwhile, the evidence of cognate texts like the Lüshi Chunqiu and Huainanzi demonstrates that classical-era readerships were quite familiar with the idea that seemingly antisocial or asocial teachings (of the kind we find everywhere in the Zhuangzi) are actually crucial for fostering effective prosocial behaviors—especially in those entrusted with looking out for others, like executives and generals.
This presentation will lay out four long-term, systemic features of the way in which we have received Zhuangist thought that I think account, in large measure, for our aversion to centering governance in how we read this text. Three of these are features of the Chinese intellectual tradition itself, and one of them is specific to the Anglophone world.
(1) Starting in the late Western Han, the emergence of a political and educational canon centered on the Confucian classics displaced texts like the Zhuangzi, the Lüshi Chunqiu, and the Huainanzi from the centrality their writers aspired to in setting the terms of serious discussion.
(2) During the Wei-Jin and Liu-Song periods (220-479), the Zhuangzi became indelibly associated with antisocial, asocial, and countercultural behaviors, notwithstanding Guo Xiang’s attempt to argue otherwise. Factors (1) and (2) together weigh in the direction of approaching Zhuangist thought as something other than a serious attempt at solving social problems.
While factor (2) was taking shape, factor (3) was as well: the availability of a confidently assertoric organized religion as a Laozi-flavored structural alternative to the Confucian classics. Factor (3) combines with factors (1) and (2) any time we assume that the Zhuangzi is rooted in spiritual or theological preoccupations instead of governance. As I would reconstruct their views, many Zhuangist writers approached governance as their chief spiritual or theological preoccupation.
The final, and potentially most decisive, of these factors is (4) the overwhelmingly individualistic orientation of the Western literati subcultures that have done the most to appropriate the Zhuangzi into English. The Zhuangzi’s writers and formative custodians were far more directly enmeshed in political power than Western academics are—to say nothing of today’s broadly educated reading public, which typically has no aspirations to the kind of high-level civil, military, and/or advisory responsibilities that anchor the biographies of virtually every historical figure we can associate with Zhuangist teachings in the early centuries. Seeing ourselves as potentially powerful in cabinet- or command-level jobs is something that most of us would have to learn; it is hard to imagine classical-era Chinese writers needing to learn how to see themselves in those terms, because they took those terms for granted. Peeling back these four factors one-by-one can help us access the ambitious and constructive in Zhuangist social and political philosophy, alongside the more familiar transgressive, escapist, and resigned.
Yi Gong (Ph.D. Candidate, School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales): “The Concept of De (德) in the Political Thought in the Zhuangzi”
This paper proposes the key role of de (德) in the political thought of the Zhuangzi. The political vision in the Zhuangzi is closely centered around the ruler's virtue. Therefore, the paper begins with an examination of the Zhuangzi’s de—often translated as “virtue”, which has ethical and political connotations. However, the meanings and connotations of its usages in this text differ from those found in other traditions, such as Confucianism. This raises several questions: What are the meanings of de in the Zhuangzi? Which of these meanings are unique to the Zhuangzi? Which are closely tied to the ideal political vision proposed in the text? Furthermore, what is the relationship between the de associated with politics and the ideal political vision in the Zhuangzi? In addition, this paper will also examine whether de can be translated as "virtue". This question is of particular importance for enabling English-speaking readers to understand the concept of de in the Zhuangzi accurately.
Shen Wenxuan (PhD student, Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville ): “Philosophy as Justification: A Critical Examination of Cross-Cultural Psychological Studies”
In this paper, I critique a group of cross-cultural psychological studies that assume East Asians and Westerners differ in how they perceive the world. These studies are based on the dialectic-analytic paradigm developed from “folk philosophies,” i.e., naïve Daoism and naïve Aristotelianism. In Section I, I introduce three pairs of “epistemological” principles that demonstrate cultural differences in the paradigm: (1) the Principle of Change and the Law of Identity; (2) the Principle of Contradiction and the Law of Noncontradiction; (3) the Principle of Relationship or Holism and the Law of the Excluded Middle. I explain how psychologists justify these principles by quoting and interpreting philosophical texts, such as the Book of Change Yijing 易经, Daoist and Confucian texts, and Ancient Greek texts (Aristotle and Zeno). In Section II, I explain Richard Nisbett’s materialistic account of how folk philosophy is developed to influence the folk perception of the world. Nisbett argues that the ecological difference between Ancient Greece and Ancient China resulted in the difference in social structures and practices. These social differences led to different folk metaphysics and “tacit epistemology.” The “scientific philosophy” is only a reflection of folk philosophy. In Section III, I critique the use of scientific philosophy in their theoretical construction. Using the Book of Change as an example, I deny the oversimplified relation between folk philosophy and scientific philosophy. Then, I point out that the paradigm has a problem of comparability. For (1), psychologists compare correlative cosmological thoughts with Aristotelian logic and the change, with a biological and (re-)generative sense, in yin-yang thoughts with the physical motion in Zeno and Aristotle’s thoughts. For (2), psychologists compare the opposite at the concrete level in yin-yang thoughts with the non-contradiction at the abstract level in Aristotelian logic. Last, I point out that psychologists fail to directly compare analogical reasoning in Chinese thoughts and deductive reasoning in Aristotelian logic. In Section IV, I consider and reject the suggestion that the paradigm could be purely developed from the folk representation of ancient philosophies without justification from scientific philosophy. I argue that three pairs of “epistemological” principles as the folk representation of ancient philosophies are empirically unsupported. Though Daoist social practices are discussed to explain why the folk representation of Daoism is chosen for the paradigm, psychologists fail to explain Greek practices that reflect Aristotelian logic. Last, I contend that using scientific philosophy to explain how folks perceive the world presumes an authoritative role of scientific philosophy in culture.
Alia Goehr (Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota) “The Moral Mind’s Outrage in Zhang Nai’s Must-Read Classical Literature (Bidu guwen 必讀古文)”
This paper examines an anthology published by scholar-official Zhang Nai (courtesy name Dongchu, jinshi 1604), entitled Major and Minor Works of Must-Read Classical Literature, Annotated, Selected, and Interpreted by Academician Zhang Dongchu 張侗初太史評選句解必讀古文綱目 (1626–27). Zhang Nai seldom appears in present-day scholarship, but he was a prominent official and educator in his day, and his anthology was widely familiar among literati throughout the seventeenth century. Among the many late-Ming officials dismissed from office due to the machinations of powerful court eunuch Wei Zhongxian (1568–1627), Zhang and his elite collaborators produced annotated anthologies of examination writing, Confucian exegesis, and classical prose and poetry. He also collaborated with Xu Guangqi (1562–1633, jinshi 1604) and the Italian Jesuit Sabatino de Ursis (1575–1620) on the technical manual Western Hydraulics. Through such projects, Zhang Nai was immersed in late-Ming print culture.
Drawing on his publishing expertise, Zhang’s multigenre compendium of classical writings deploys the formal affordances of late-Ming anthologies to identify itself with—and creatively intervene in—a longstanding Confucian discourse on the relationship between writing and the Way. According to Zhou Dunyi’s (1017–1073) famous pronouncement, “writing is that which conveys the Way.” Yet, as Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) discourses on writing assert, writing is also at risk of giving way to talent (cai), a personal quality which may serve the Way or work against it by inclining toward personal desires. From this standpoint, writing is a site of contest between the Confucian moral mind and the human mind’s baser proclivities.
Zhang’s anthology enacts a hierarchical logic that aligns with these entrenched Confucian concerns. The “Major and Minor” writings announced in the anthology’s title are organized into four clearly ranked categories prominently advertised on the anthology’s title page as morality, statecraft, expression, and talent—in that order. The work’s reading guidelines identify the two upper categories as “guiding principles” and the two lower categories as “minor items.” Yet Zhang Nai’s anthology dextrously conflates the Confucian morality espoused in its paratextual materials with an aesthetically esteemed tradition of writings motivated by enmity (yuan) or indignation (fen). This becomes apparent upon examination of the compendium’s contents. The uppermost rank, which contains 27 pieces, is replete with the works of impassioned political martyrs ranging from Qu Yuan, to the disgraced Han-dynasty general Li Ling, to the Tang-dynasty scholar Han Yu.
Such contents are subversive in that they run counter to famous Confucian pronouncements on writing and the Way. Zhu Xi esteemed Qu Yuan’s writing for its expressive impact but observed that Qu’s writing “tended toward the unrestrained and demonic, and his enmity and resentment were aroused to such a degree that [his writings] cannot be used as standards.” And in Instructions for Practical Living, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) dismisses Han Yu as merely “a giant among writers” before launching into an extended tirade against writings that do not transmit the Way. By presenting as models exactly those writers whom Confucian progenitors had identified as problematic, and doing so in Confucian terms, I propose that Zhang Nai and his associates aimed to synthesize this aesthetic tradition with Confucian standards in order to propose that the moral mind could contain outrage without giving way to selfish desire. Given Zhang Nai’s political context, it is not hard to see why he would have deemed this intervention necessary.
Richard Kim (Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago): “Mencius on the Continuity Problem in Moral Development”
This talk focuses on a significant problem in moral development which some Aristotelians have labeled The Problem of Continuity. I examine two recent attempts to resolve this problem and argue that Mencius offers a compelling alternative. Drawing on his account of shame and the role of moral recollection, I argue that Mencius provides a rich and satisfying framework for understanding the path toward virtue.
Amy Gardner (Graduate Student, Eastern Michigan University): Fondness and Action: Hao 好 as Moral Motivation in Confucius’ Philosophy
My paper argues that hao 好 is an important part of Confucius’ philosophy. This is to two ends: (1) I argue that hao is a kind of external moral motivator within Confucius’ philosophy, and (2) I provide an analysis of hao that can aid discussion about qing 情.
I begin by asserting that hao should be seen as a technical term given recognition beyond haoxue 好學. Throughout the Analects, the Dialogues of Confucius (Kongzi Jia Yu 孔子家語), and once in the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence (Xiao Jing 孝經), hao appears a significant number of times paired with important terms that are notably not xue such as zhi 知, ren 仁, yi 義, xin 信, de 德, and li 禮. As Confucius discusses these virtues specifically as preferring (hao 好) and not only as having, embodying, or acting in accordance with them, I argue that an exploration as to what preferring a virtue encompasses and adds to Confucius’ philosophy is worthy of study. I keep within a role ethics framework when discussing hao and focus only on Confucius and his moral philosophy. This leads me to consider preferences as relational and based on one’s roles, stemming from one's inborn nature.
In seeking to understand what hao can bring to Confucian philosophy, I begin by discussing its character as a general motivator that influences actions broadly, and highlight the resultant impact that preferences have. People’s preferences (especially if they hold a position of power) can have wide-reaching consequences, impacting or educating people as far as generations in the future. This allows preferences to not be entirely personal or internal, while also having direct impact in the world.
After this, I argue that there are different levels at which hao exists. This allows for hao to be at a general, natural level as well as a cultivated level that specifically motivates moral action. This is where the split occurs for future research and entrance into ongoing discourse. Hao at the unreflective level allows it to line up with its use as one of the emotions, while the cultivated level aligns with moral action and social life. While both levels are applicable to qing, I focus more on its place as a moral motivator in the following sections.
Because of this, I show evidence for hao as motivating action, as it is not intuitive that a person’s likes or preferences specifically guide their actions. There are several passages I use as evidence for this claim where one’s preferences are the only factor given for guiding action. This shows that preferences are connected to action, allowing me to say that they are, when cultivated, moral motivators.
Following this, I discuss times in which hao is not linked to action. These instances do not detract from hao as a motivator. Instead, they align with Confucius’ political philosophy. Those whose preferences do not lead to obvious actions are acting through non-action. Their governing through non-action (stemming from preferences) allows the people to self-govern (zi zhi 自治). Thus, hao not leading to action in these circumstances, rather than diminishing my argument, actually strengthens it by showing how it applies beyond a moral dimension to a political dimension in Confucius' thought.
I finish by discussing how preferences interact with each other, showing how they influence each other to create or guard against certain kinds of action. This, once again, aligns with Confucius’ thoughts on virtues, as they need to be cultivated together to be strong. It also shows what cultivating preferences will look like for people, as they will never just be focused on one preference.
With this, we see how understanding hao adds a new dimensionality to Confucian philosophy. Hao can be seen as an external moral motivator in role ethics, as well as providing new insight about governing through non-action. Both dimensions invite further investigation into how this aspect of hao can improve our understanding of qing.
Brent Matheny (Ph.D. student in Philosophy, Penn State University): “Towards a Queer Confucianism: Identity Pride as a Virtue”
Much of Confucian thought is based on a picture of the family foreign to those whose course of life is not characterized by heterosexual coupling resulting in children. Many queer people are alienated from their biological family and structurally unable to cultivate the specific biological kin relationships Confucianism values. Queer people, whose lives deviate from the de facto subjects of ethical theorizing in classical Confucianism, may reasonably ask: What does Confucianism do for me? Any form Confucianism worth adopting today, I argue, will need to have an answer.
On the one hand, classical Confucianism centers biological kin relations, espouses literal conservatism about ritual, and makes cisheteropatriarchal evaluations about what sorts of lives are worth living. On the other hand, the relational world of Confucianism, as Ames and Rosemont have shown, can be a powerful prophylactic against invidious strands of individualism pervasive in western moral theorizing and finds unlikely sympathy with some feminist critiques. In this exploratory paper, I take up I.M. Sullivan’s invocation of the possibility of a “queer Confucian philosophy.” To this end, I synthesize Barnes’s notion of disability pride and Sarkissian’s account of de (德) as a moral virtue of influence to develop a novel account of identity pride, the opposite of which is not humility, but shame. Using queer pride, I then show how four classical Confucian virtues may be queered. I suggest that the relation between ren (仁) and li (禮) can help us understand the subtle codes and care of queer subcultures and that the virtues of xiao (孝) and yi (義) can help us learn our place in herstory, respect our queer elders, and fight social injustice. Taken together, these queer Confucian virtues can assist us in differentiating morally edifying pride from its pernicious variations.
Much of Confucian thought is based on a picture of the family foreign to those whose course of life is not characterized by heterosexual coupling resulting in children. Many queer people are alienated from their biological family and structurally unable to cultivate the specific biological kin relationships Confucianism values. Queer people, whose lives deviate from the de facto subjects of ethical theorizing in classical Confucianism, may reasonably ask: What does Confucianism do for me? Any form Confucianism worth adopting today, I argue, will need to have an answer.
On the one hand, classical Confucianism centers biological kin relations, espouses literal conservatism about ritual, and makes cisheteropatriarchal evaluations about what sorts of lives are worth living. On the other hand, the relational world of Confucianism, as Ames and Rosemont have shown, can be a powerful prophylactic against invidious strands of individualism pervasive in western moral theorizing and finds unlikely sympathy with some feminist critiques. In this exploratory paper, I take up I.M. Sullivan’s invocation of the possibility of a “queer Confucian philosophy.” To this end, I synthesize Barnes’s notion of disability pride and Sarkissian’s account of de (德) as a moral virtue of influence to develop a novel account of identity pride, the opposite of which is not humility, but shame. Using queer pride, I then show how four classical Confucian virtues may be queered. I suggest that the relation between ren (仁) and li (禮) can help us understand the subtle codes and care of queer subcultures and that the virtues of xiao (孝) and yi (義) can help us learn our place in herstory, respect our queer elders, and fight social injustice. Taken together, these queer Confucian virtues can assist us in differentiating morally edifying pride from its pernicious variations.
Edgar Vasquez (Graduate Student, Eastern Michigan University): “The Confucian Dilemma of Service, in an Unjust World”
Within the Analects, there are frequent points where Confucius advises against serving in an unjust or corrupt government. This advice clashes, however, with one of the implicit goals of early Confucian thought, and a personal goal of Confucius, himself, to serve in a government for the sake of bringing about social harmony. During times in which the government is corrupt or unjust, these two elements create a dilemma. The first horn comes from the overarching goal to serve the government for the sake of the flourishing of the people. The second horn arises in the event of a corrupt government, in which case one should not serve in the government, for reasons often not spelled out in the early texts. Much of this presentation will explore the second horn to give motivation to Confucius’ injunction to not serve in corrupt governments. Primarily, I discuss Confucian-inspired socially embedded agency and how it limits our independence, thus creating the risk for corruption to one’s own character. Then I explore an alternative primary goal for Confucianism, self-cultivation. Appealing to Confucius’ emphasis on role modelling as a form of bringing about virtue in others, I argue that self-cultivation and inspiring virtue in others is another Confucian way of bettering the state and serving the people. This way, one can contribute to the same end listed in the first horn, without the drawback presented in the second horn (being corrupted). This provides a way out of the dilemma on Confucius’ own terms. This discussion can provide insight into how we, ourselves, ought to pursue social change and live our lives in a world of imperfect justice. I close with some considerations of the contemporary relevance to Western democracies, though such settings complicate the dilemma in important ways.
Aleksei Alward (Undergraduate Student Philosophy, Eastern Michigan University) - “Ritual Propriety and “Proper” Emotions: How Li and Feelings Interact in The Dialogues of Confucius”
Because Confucius stresses the importance of genuine emotion in the practice of li, it’s possible to read his sense of propriety as prescriptive to the emotions themselves. As the core virtues of Confucianism all involve emotions, to act in accord with these virtues we must know how emotions relate. One possible interpretation of the virtue-emotion relation is that Confucius would tell people who don’t feel the emotion appropriate to the ceremony (who don’t feel grief at a funeral or happiness at a celebration) that they are having the wrong emotions and can’t live up to that virtue. The interpretation that li dictates a “correct” emotion, however, does not match the operation of li provided in the Dialogues of Confucius (Kongzi Jia Yu 孔子家語), which provides a more in-depth look at how Confucius’ philosophy operates, as context is provided for sayings and stories. The Dialogues provides and portrays a model of li that values genuine emotion in relation to the central function of li as a means of channeling and expressing emotions. A prescriptive model to dictate what emotions are “right” would undermine why the genuine emotions are important. Following li does not take a prescriptive expectation of what feelings are the “right” ones to have—that would be an unreasonable expectation to put on people—but rather, li provides an opportunity for emotions to be expressed and processed. In this paper, I perform a close reading of passages that describe li in operation in the Dialogues and identify this operation. First, I will establish some ground by looking at how emotions are represented in the Dialogues, drawing a difference between unlearned feelings and cultivated emotions. Next, I’ll look at how li itself is defined by flexible standards that respond to the situation of the participant and what they need out of a given ritual. Lastly, I’ll put those together and examine how li and emotions mutually inform as li provides a channel for emotions to be expressed and the emotions of the participant effect the form which li takes.
K. Gustin Law (Collegiate Assistant Professor, University of Chicago): “Mengzi and Aristotle on the ‘naturalness’ of virtue acquisition”
Attentive juxtaposition of Aristotle and Mengzi on the acquisition of virtue compels us to ask important questions that might otherwise escape us about each thinker. Aristotle says that virtues arise in us “neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but because we naturally/innately admit of them and are brought to completion through habit” (Nicomachean Ethics 1103a23-26). He also thinks that the virtue of a good citizen, depending on societal circumstances, can be fulfilled by something other than human virtue (Politics 3.4). Seemingly, for Aristotle, our virtue acquisition is non-natural. Mengzi, on the other hand, appeals frequently to a plant’s growth to represent a human’s becoming virtuous. He endorses that the “nature” of human “is good,” in the sense that “if one goes by one’s genuine feelings / inherent conditions / authentic conditions, one can become good by them” (Mengzi 3A1, 6A6.4-5). It is true that the “nature” of x in Aristotle translates the “phusis” of x – x’s inherent “source/starting-point” of its own change (Physics 192b8-27) – whereas the “nature” of x in Mengzi translates the “xìng” of x – roughly, the course of x’s development insofar as x is uninjured and conditions are favorable. But it seems that a feature that arises in a living thing by the latter’s inherent source of change is a feature that arises in its development insofar as conditions are favorable and it is uninjured, and so tension remains between the “neutral phusis” and the “good xìng” view.
If there really is tension, it is important to see why. Aristotle’s reason for his “neutral phusis” view, in the case of virtues of character, is that they result from habituation. But seemingly Mengzi agrees when he says e.g. that it is “the accumulating of propriety/righteousness” that gives rise to a robust psychophysiological disposition (2A2.15). He seems to agree that one can progress by practicing what is relevantly like the characteristic conduct of the virtuous, and that recurrence of some kind is crucial (6A9). As for Mengzi’s reason for his own “good xìng” view, it is partly that everyone is born with “sprouts” – dispositions that are virtues in incipient forms. He adduces, as example and evidence, that everyone would experience alarm and unease if they suddenly see a child about to fall into a well (2A6.3). But if the point is that everyone is born with a disposition that is itself faultless and good, and to cultivate virtues is to further develop sprouts such as this, Aristotle may agree as well, if he implies – scholars have perceptively suggested – in Nicomachean Ethics 1104b30-34 that everyone has an appreciation for the kalon, the fine/noble/beautiful. For to be well disposed toward the kalon seems in itself faultless and good, and cultivating virtues presumably involves developing dispositions such as this (e.g. by learning what really is kalon and what not). These apparent agreements make it all the more intriguing that the two thinkers seem to maintain divergent views, “neutral phusis” vs. “good xìng.” So, in this paper I ascertain whether those apparent agreements are genuine by determining whether Aristotle’s “habituation” and Mengzi’s “accumulating” are relevantly different and, in any case, whether the thinkers diverge at some other junctures. For example, must Mengzi accept Aristotle’s tacit premise that if one becomes F by habituation, then such becoming is not by phusis? Conversely, to what extent should Aristotle accept Mengzi’s assimilation of our becoming good to a plant’s growing? And whether or not Aristotle and Mengzi see eye to eye on xìng or on phusis, further questions present themselves. Is Aristotle’s model of virtue acquisition developmental (we have innate nascent versions of virtues to be nurtured) or re-formation (we start with at best neutral dispositions, which must be reshaped)? Although he does not think that we become virtuous by our phusis, the role played by our appreciation of the kalon in his picture might render it a developmental model, like Mengzi’s. Lastly, how, if at all, does Mengzi’s “accumulating” or Aristotle’s “habituating” (if not the same) mesh with nurturing a preexisting, incipiently virtuous disposition into a mature one, on Mengzi’s model (and Aristotle’s if his is also developmental)?
Hagop Sarkissian (Professor, CUNY Baruch): “Why did Mengzi claim that human nature is good?”
Mengzi famously claimed that human nature is good, and this turned out to be momentous for the Confucian tradition. Not only did it become the orthodox view in later times, but it also caused a schism within the school that would persist for millennia. My question is: why did he do it? Scholars have proposed various explanations, but there is no consensus in the literature. One view suggests that Mengzi's assertion was a dialectical move to provide a solid foundation for his normative ethical theory; by rooting moral knowledge in human nature, he could argue for the universality and permanence of his preferred ethical principles, claiming them to be more well founded than those of rivals. Another view posits that Mengzi was trying to answer the general question "Why be moral?" by suggesting that, in some deep sense, we already are. By claiming morality to be part of our natures, he could effectively reply to those claiming inability to respond to moral considerations. Others maintain that Mengzi was responding to the intellectual climate of his time; human nature had become a hot topic in philosophical discourse, and Mengzi may have felt compelled to stake out a distinctive position to establish his reputation. Yet another interpretation argues that Mengzi's claim about innate human goodness was never intended as a substantive metaphysical statement. Instead, Mengzi recognized the practical benefits of promoting a belief in natural human goodness; by encouraging people to notice their moral capacities—whatever their origin—he may have hoped to foster ethical behavior and social harmony. Finally (and most obviously), Mengzi might have simply believed that human nature is good, thus making appeals to other contextual or strategic explanations superfluous. In this presentation, I will delve into these questions, surveying existing answers in the scholarly literature and critically examining each interpretation's strengths and weaknesses. In doing so, I aim to illuminate Mengzi's philosophical motivations, as well as the far-reaching implications of his claim for Confucian thought.
Ben Huff (Professor, Randolph Macon College): “Freedom as a Moral Achievement in Mencius”
“I have a weakness. I am fond of valor.” When Mencius calls King Xuan of Qi to a life of virtuous kingship, the king responds with ambivalence. He does admire the example of the ancient sage-kings, but he finds his desires pulling him in another direction. The model of the sage kings feels like an uncomfortable restraint. However, Mencius’ persuasive strategy aims to help King Xuan overcome this inner division, recognizing the ideal of benevolent government not as an alien imposition but as something that his own desires draw him toward, if he rightly “measure[s] his heart.” That is to say, Mencius calls King Xuan (and all of us) to understand the life of virtue as a life of freedom: pursuing and realizing his “supreme ambition” or “greatest desire” (da yu ⼤欲), understood in a wise and appropriate way.1 Words naturally translated as “freedom” or “free” are rare in the Mencius. Yet in response to debates in his time, Mencius takes up the theoretical project of showing that the life of virtue embodies an especially deep and comprehensive form of freedom. His ethics, moral psychology, and cosmology transform our understanding of personal identity and agency. To follow uncultivated desires is self-defeating, like climbing a tree to catch a fish. True freedom flows on the one hand from the harmonious inward 2 constitution of the virtuous agent, whom Mencius describes as fulfilling human nature (jin xing 盡性), and fulfilling his heart (jin xin 盡⼼). On the other hand, fulfilling human nature allows one to achieve tremendous outward power, as a minister or agent of Heaven (tian li 天吏), harmonizing with and carrying out Heaven’s decree (li ming ⽴ 命). This combination of inner harmony and outward power, achieved through virtue, 3 creates a compelling vision of human freedom that remains appealing today.
Wenyang Gao (PhD Candidate, Brown University) “Intergenerational Responsibility: A Mencian Virtue-based Account”
While democratic citizens are self-interest-centered, the alarming ecological degradation requires them to be less self-centered, expand their time horizons, and cultivate a sense of intergenerational responsibility—to consider the interests of future generations. Many have argued that, nourished by Western ethical perspectives, the current generation suffers from a motivational deficit, as they cannot establish adequately meaningful connections to future generations and incorporate the well-being of future generations into their political thinking.
What insights, if any, does Confucian philosophy offer us to conceptualize an account of intergenerational responsibility? In this paper, I argue that although the relational conception of persons account of Confucian intergenerational ethics (Hourdequin & Wong, 2021) avoids problems underlying the self-interested individualistic stance, it suffers from the communitarian orientation: overemphasis on individuals' identification with community values, and insufficient space for future generations' embrace of new ethical and cultural values. Drawing on Mencius' work, I develop a virtue-based account of intergenerational responsibility. It argues that individuals are people who live in time. They bear a direct sense of responsibility towards future generations. Rather than conceiving future generations as constitutive to their identities, the current generation understands that to live a flourishing life; they should consider future generations' well-being, which does not amount to a single transgenerational moral community. They are open to future generations' having different conceptions of the good. Moreover, instead of emphasizing social norms, the Mencian account underscores the cultivation of moral agency. The Mencian virtue-based account sheds new light on the issue of intergenerational responsibility.
Shizhen Xie ( University of New South Wales) Paper Title Is It Appropriate for Filial Children to Resent Their Parents? Rethinking Shun’s Resentment in the Mengzi
Shun, one of the revered Confucian sage-kings, is an exemplary filial son in the Confucian classic Mengzi. As Confucians generally believe, filial children are appropriately affectionate and dutiful toward their parents. Therefore, it is not appropriate for them to feel negative emotions toward their parents, such as resentment. Yet, in Mengzi 5A1, Shun appears to resent his parents, which would seem inconsistent with the Confucian image of filiality. In this paper, I consider two possible interpretations of Shun’s resentment. On the first interpretation, it is believed that Shun’s resentment is directed not at his parents but at himself. This is mainly because Shun’s resentment entails holding parents morally responsible, which hurts relational affection (qinqin 親親) in the parent-child relationship. By comparison, the second interpretation claims that Shun resents his parents on the basis that his parents intended to murder him. To support the latter interpretation, especially defending its ethical idea, I introduce and refine Carlsson’s notion of ‘tragic resentment’. This is a kind of resentment that does not assign moral blame. I argue that Shun’s ‘resentment and yearning’ is exactly this case. My paper proposes that it is appropriate for filial children to feel tragic resentment toward their parents when parents perpetrate serious crimes. However, tragic resentment alone is insufficient to preserve a filial child’s relational affection for their parents in some ethical dilemmas. Therefore, I believe it is crucial for filial children to seek reconciliation with their parents.